New Textualism in Constitutional Law by Strauss, David A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1997
New Textualism in Constitutional Law
David A. Strauss
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Strauss, "New Textualism in Constitutional Law," 66 George Washington Law Review 1153 (1997).
The New Textualism in
Constitutional Law
David A. Strauss*
No one can fail to admire the tremendous erudition and creativity that
Akhil Amar brings to the project of interpreting the Constitution, particu-
larly in the book from which his contribution to this Symposium is excerpted,
The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. Time after time, Professor
Amar shows us many new things about how the drafters of the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment thought about the issues they were address-
ing. All of us are in his debt for that.
The question is whether Professor Amar's impressive project goes be-
yond being intellectual history and tells us something substantial about how
the difficult constitutional issues of today should be resolved. Here I have
some doubts. Some of the reasons for those doubts are familiar: whatever
the right answer to the questions that arise under the Bill of Rights today-
questions about the proper limits on police behavior, about the right to bear
arms, or any other subject-it is difficult to believe that they should be re-
solved primarily on the basis of judgments made in the eighteenth or nine-
teenth centuries by people living in utterly different circumstances. But I
also want to suggest two things that are perhaps less obvious about the textu-
alist approach to constitutional interpretation that Professor Amar uses with
such extraordinary skill. First, textualism, although often defended as a par-
ticularly democratic approach to constitutional interpretation, in fact rests on
a heroic view about the drafters of the Constitution and is in that sense
deeply antidemocratic. Second, although textualism is prominently thought
to be a way to limit the power of judges who interpret the Constitution, it in
fact provides only the weakest of restraints; a purely textualist approach is an
invitation to judicial creativity.
In order to try to make these points more clearly-and because you
can't beat somebody with nobody-I will offer an alternative to the textualist
conception of constitutional interpretation. The alternative view is that the
Constitution we have today is the product of a common law-like develop-
ment and is not just the document drafted in the eighteenth century and for-
mally amended from time to time. The Constitution today is a collection of
well-established principles, traditions, and precedents that, although never
completely unconnected to the text, have elaborated the text in complex
ways not discernible from the text itself. Today American constitutional law
is, for the most part, a common law system in which the role of the text is
decidedly secondary. It is the product of the wisdom not just of Madison and
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Bingham, but of other generations as well-and not only the judges of those
generations.1
"Granted," Professor Amar writes, "lawyers and judges must often go
beyond the letter of the law, but the text itself is an obvious starting point of
legal analysis. Is it even possible to deduce the spirit of a law without looking
at its letter?"'2 But today the text is usually not the obvious starting point for
most legal analysis of the Bill of Rights. Nearly every lawyer or judge today,
when faced with an issue under the Bill of Rights, starts with the established
principles and precedents, not with the text. In the legal analysis of constitu-
tional issues, as it is practiced today in our system, the text, as likely as not,
never explicitly enters the picture. And although Professor Amar's point
about looking at the letter to deduce the spirit is characteristically trenchant,
it only raises the question of what the letter of the law is. Nothing says it has
to be the text alone, in isolation from the precedents and traditions.
I. Textualism and Heroism
My first qualm about textualism, as practiced both by Amar and by
those who are less nuanced, is that it takes essentially a heroic view of the
Constitution. In the textualist vision, there was a time-a moment-when
someone got it right. If we can just reconstruct what they decided at that
time, we will have the answers we need. The "they" who got it right might be
the drafters of the Constitution, or the founding generation, or "We the Peo-
ple" somehow defined, or perhaps certain key generations in American his-
tory. But, according to textualist views and others of the same family, there
was a time when, by virtue of intense political reflection or purity of motiva-
tion (or, some might say, divine inspiration), some group of people figured
out the answers. Our task today is to reconstruct-or simply recover-their
answers. The reconstruction might take a lot of careful and subtle argument,
as it does in Professor Amar's work. But reconstruction of their-the he-
roes'-judgments and conclusions, is the key.
It seems to me that things don't work that way. Constitutional princi-
ples, the basic decisions about how to govern a society like ours, are ham-
mered out over time. They are not the product of an epiphany. They are
hammered out in the courts, in the legislatures, and in society at large. After
we hammer them out, we may attribute them to an earlier heroic moment.
"The Framers of the Constitution well understood . . . " we say, before at-
tributing to the Framers the position that we have concluded (perhaps after
many false starts) is the right interpretation of the First or Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Often attributing ideas to the Framers is in the nature of
mythmaking. Myths serve a valuable purpose, but the reality of the way soci-
eties work is more evolutionary and organic than textualist approaches allow.
A tale of four constitutional amendments-two that were adopted and
two that were not-can make this point. The two that were adopted are the
1 For a development of this view, see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. Ray,. 877 (1996).
2 Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1143, 1143
(1998).
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Fifteenth and Nineteenth. Anyone reading the text of the Constitution, with-
out knowing more about American history, would conclude that African
Americans were enfranchised in 1870, when the Fifteenth Amendment was
adopted, and that women were not enfranchised until fifty years later. Of
course that is not what happened. After the end of Reconstruction, the vast
majority of African Americans in the United States could not vote. African
Americans were not truly enfranchised until more than ninety years after the
Fifteenth Amendment was adopted. Women, on the other hand, had the
right to vote in many states even before the Nineteenth Amendment was
adopted. And the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, unlike the rati-
fication of the Fifteenth, did settle the issue once and for all; there was no
massive resistance to women's suffrage.
In other words, although the Civil War generation added the Fifteenth
Amendment, the actual decision to enfranchise African Americans took
much longer. By the same token, although the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment was perhaps a pivotal event, much of our society had made the
decision to enfranchise women before the Nineteenth Amendment was
adopted. The Nineteenth Amendment ratified something that had occurred
at a much deeper level in society-just as the Fifteenth Amendment did not
really become an operative part of the Constitution until society had changed
at a deeper level. These aspects of our constitutional development do not fit
with a textualist account.
It might be said, on behalf of a textualist approach, that these points are
descriptive but not normative. The Fifteenth Amendment should have been
enforced as soon as it was adopted. The Fifteenth Amendment, it might be
said, was a part of the Constitution from 1870 and on, and-no argument
here-it is scandalous that the Fifteenth Amendment was flouted. But just as
the adoption of a new constitutional text does not always change the consti-
tutional order, the constitutional order can be changed-in fundamental
ways-by "texts" that are never adopted. The point is the same: the content
of the Constitution is determined not by a heroic decision by drafters or ra-
tifiers to add text to the Constitution, but by a messier, more complex and
prolonged process.
Consider, for example the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have
forbidden the denial of equal rights on the basis of gender. The Equal Rights
Amendment was proposed for ratification and was rejected when three-
quarters of the states did not ratify it in time. Yet the Equal Rights Amend-
ment has, in practice, become part of the Constitution. It is difficult today to
identify any legal rule that would be different if the Equal Rights Amend-
ment had been adopted. The presence or absence of an Equal Rights
Amendment in the text has, to put it bluntly, turned out to be irrelevant to
the constitutional order. Surely that should give textualists some pause.
There is an even more dramatic example. Before the Civil War, there
was a lively and inconclusive debate over whether the Constitution permitted
states to secede. There is no longer any such debate; the issue was settled by
the Civil War. No one today would seriously advance the position that the
Constitution permits secession, at least the kind that the Confederacy at-
tempted. Where is the text that settled this question? The answer, of course,
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is that this question, like other important constitutional questions, is decided
by something other than the text.
A textual approach to constitutional interpretation is often defended as
the most democratic. The text, it is said, is what the people (often capital-
ized) adopted. Moreover, they adopted it in a manner and at a time that was
likely to produce an especially true expression of their will. None of the gloss
later added by judges or by accepted traditions has the same democratic ped-
igree. A common law view, the argument continues, reflects the opinion of
unelected judges, a small, elite segment of society, and not of the people at
large.
In fact, democracy and heroism-including heroism of the kind that un-
dergirds textualist views-do not go together very well. Common law-like
processes of evolution are not as democratic as a plebiscite, but in their own
way they are highly democratic. Consider, for example, two ways in which
one might try to justify the Supreme Court's decisions on gender equality-
the decisions in which, for all practical purposes, the Court acted as if the
Equal Rights Amendment was part of the Constitution.3 One way would be
to find a justification in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, or (as
Professor Amar may be suggesting) in some synthesis of the Nineteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That is, one might come up with an Amar-like
account of the text and history that would make a case for finding a principle
of gender equality in the text of the Constitution.
The alternative would be to say that what "ratified" the Equal Rights
Amendment was not a decision by the Framers of any constitutional text but
the growing acceptance (not just by lawyers but by citizens) of the principle
reflected in judicial decisions, legislation, and private parties' conduct that
gender discrimination is not to be allowed. That principle was not adopted in
any meaningful way by the people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
although it is obviously consistent with the text of that Amendment. Rather,
it emerged as society, and particularly the role of women, changed. The
change in the Constitution was the product of a gradual evolution in opin-
ion-not one self-consciously political decision, but countless acts of people
living ordinary lives. That gradual evolution is, in a real sense, far more re-
flective of a truly democratic mandate than any flash of progressive insight
we might discover in the records of the post-Civil War generation.
II. Textualism and Restraint
Many of the most prominent exponents of textualism-notably Justice
Black a generation ago and Justice Scalia today-urge that departing from
the text permits judges too much leeway to read their own views into the law.
Adhering to the text is the course of salutary judicial self-restraint. Professor
Amar does not explicitly make this argument, although perhaps his implicit
identification of "the letter of the law" with the text suggests that same view.4
3 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
4 Amar, supra note 2, at 1143.
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In any event, it is, I believe, important to see just how little restraint
textualism provides, at least in interpreting the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion is phrased in such broad terms that a judge who adheres simply to the
text can do essentially anything he or she wants. It is child's play to turn the
text of the Equal Protection Clause-considered in isolation-into a radical
and implausible constitutional requirement that wealth be equally distrib-
uted: "'Equal protection of the laws' includes equal protection, by the laws,
against the vicissitudes of the market. So long as property laws and other
laws maintain a system in which some people suffer more from market forces
than others, the Equal Protection Clause is being violated." At the other
extreme, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been used, by my
colleague Richard Epstein, as the basis for a constitutional prohibition
against any redistribution.5
Professor Amar himself shows just how far a creative textualist can go.
He suggests that the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
might together be read to provide a constitutional basis for the New Deal-
that is, for the rejection of freedom of contract as a constitutional principle
and for the expansion of federal regulatory authority. 6 Professor Amar ex-
plains that "increased national power and the increased permissibility of eco-
nomic redistribution.., are... central themes of the textual Progressive-era
amendments."'7 He is careful to say that he is only raising the possibility of a
textual justification for the New Deal's changed constitutional understand-
ings, not purporting to provide such a justification.8 Still, Professor Amar
seems to be raising the possibility that, in textualist terms, it may be permissi-
ble to use an amendment authorizing a progressive income tax as a basis for a
"textual" argument that redistribution is a permissible aim of government
generally-and to use amendments that establish a national rule about wo-
men's suffrage and reduce state legislators' power by authorizing the direct
election of Senators as a general warrant for increasing the regulatory power
of the federal government. These may well be good arguments, but if this is
textualism, it is difficult to say that textualism will be a source of much judi-
cial restraint.
In fact, what restrains judges is not the text of a broadly worded docu-
ment like the United States Constitution. What restrains judges is precedent,
the same thing that has restrained American and British judges for centuries
in common law cases. Of course precedents can be interpreted in different
ways. But a judge who follows precedent in good faith will find that his or
her room to maneuver is often clearly bounded. A judge who follows only
the text, and nothing else, will be much less restrained. It is precedent that
makes my hypothetical interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause obvi-
ously bad constitutional law. Precedent, not text, gives the First Amendment
the shape it has today. The development of other central principles of consti-
tutional law-the legitimacy of the administrative state; the prohibition
5 See RicHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRivATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DomAiN (1985).
6 See Amar, supra note 2, at 1146.
7 Id.
8 See id.
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against race and gender discrimination; the expansion of federal legislative
and executive power-all took place in the way that common law principles
develop in the law of torts or contracts. They developed case by case. They
did not develop by direct inference from the text.
Professor Amar is at his eloquent best in describing the role that the Bill
of Rights plays in our political culture. "The American people-outside
courtrooms, outside law offices-confront, and lay claim to, the Bill of Rights
as a text."9 He then quotes several of the majestic phrases of the Bill of
Rights that have indeed entered the vocabulary of "ordinary citizens."'10 But
the Bill of Rights that, as Professor Amar says, "live[s] in the hearts and
minds of ordinary Americans"" is not just the text. Clear and present dan-
ger; reckless disregard of the truth; separation of church and state; the pre-
sumption of innocence; proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the
Miranda warnings; the unlawfulness of race and gender discrimination-
these legal concepts have also entered the popular culture, and they are not
found in the text. They are found in the cases; they are the product of an
evolution of popular understandings. However heroic the Framers were, it
would be surprising, and disappointing, if our Constitution had not evolved in
important ways in the many generations that have passed since the framing.
But the Constitution has evolved, and it is not clear that textualism can ever
give an adequate account of that central fact of our constitutional order.
9 Id. at 1144.
10 See id.
11 Id.
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* At the Symposium, Professor Lessig presented his previously published article, Lawrence Les-
sig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 125. The commentators
then remarked on that paper, and here, Professor Lessig provides a written response to their
comments.
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